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MANNERHEIM AND HIS PERSONALITY 
CULT IN FINLAND  
Anssi Halmesvirta 
Introduction 
Personality cult has commonly been understood as a phenomenon of 
totalitarian or otherwise more or less anti-democratic political cultures. 
However, there are stable democratic regimes in which great men, statesmen, 
soldiers, sages, writers and artists have been greatly admired to the point when 
the admiration has been transformed into a cult (cf. e.g. Shakespeare from Eng-
land, J.L. Runeberg from Finland). In what follows, I examine the emergence, 
historical vicissitudes and (pre)conditions of the revival of the personality cult of 
C.G.E. Mannerheim (1867–1952), the Marshall of Finland who led the Finnish 
army during the Winter (1939–1940) and Continuation (1941–1944) War. Also 
the ideational content and the political messages of the cult – its use and abuse in 
political education of the youth – are disentangled in order to contribute to the 
contemporary history of ideas.  
When analyzing the personality cult, one needs a simple definition: it is an 
excessive admiration of a person. In comparison to respect which is a quite 
legitimate moral feeling for a person who has done ‘great deeds’ for his/her 
people, admiration, when growing out of proportion, becomes a sentiment which 
often makes imagination construct fantastic ‘higher mental reality’, a cult-
personality in place of a historically ‘real’ person.
1
 Imagine a Hungarian General 
had beaten the Austrian/Russian army in 1849 – this General would have 
become a great war-hero never to be forgotten. This is what has happened to 
Mannerheim under whose leadership the Finnish army did stop the Russians 
twice, thus making him a popular war-hero for many Finn today (see PICTURE 
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 In their case tributes and homage paid to Mannerheim and his memory are 
based on real achievement, and they are everyday expressions of the so called 
public history in Finland, for instance, on his birthday, the day of the flag of 
Finland, June the 4
th
. Furthermore, Mannerheim has become internationally 
famous as his doctrines of winter war strategy are still taught in many military 
academies in the world. Nevertheless, the story of his personality cult is much 
more complicated, calling for an analysis and explanation in view of its 
persistence, multiplication of cult venues and invention of new forms of eulogy 
and admiration for him.  
One can differentiate at least six modes in which Mannerheim’s personality 
cult manifests itself:  
1. Cult sites: in Finland there are two Mannerheim museums (in Hel-
sinki and the Headquarters’ Museum in Mikkeli), there is a grave 
monument in Helsinki, numerous statues and, for instance, in Gene-
va, there stands an obelisk for him in the Mannerheim Park. In every 
church in Finland, the Command of Mannerheim is hanging on the 
wall near the pulpit – a spot to say thanks not only to God but also to 
the Savior Mannerheim. A special case is pantheonization: Manner-
heim is elevated among the holy few worth of almost godlike admira-
tion and remembrance. The Finnish pantheon does not exist physical-
ly anywhere but it is in the minds of cult-mongers and practitioners 
(there is no Square of Heroes in Finland). 
2. Cult practices: there are numerous yearly ceremonies and commem-
orations. There are diverse pictorial representations (a stamp, a coin), 
novels, memoirs, amateurish public history publications challenging 
the official biographies. The latest developments are two movies 
planned, one to be directed by Renny Harlin as a Hollywood-
adventure film, the other, more serious attempt declaring to be ’truth-
ful’ to his life.
3
  
3. Falsification of history by magnification: in popular history and 
biographical publications Mannerheim’s personality is made bigger 
and more perfect than his real deeds and achievements imply. These 
magnified images are also being used politically in a neo-
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traditionalistic fashion as a model for character-building of young in 
education (see details below: Mannerheimiana). 
4. The nationalist function of cult: Mannerheim-cult buttresses na-
tional pride and is one of the cornerstones onto which build and 
maintain Finnish national identity. This has populist and banal fea-
tures: if one does not have (great) achievements of one’s own, one 
can take pride in Mannerheim’s great deeds.
4
  
5. Mystification: many Mannerheim-myths have been invented and 
manufactured making him appear in various controversial or even 
scandalous guises. The utmost, defamatory example was to show him 
in an animated cartoon titled Uralin perhonen (Butterfly from the 
Urals) as a weird homosexual wearing a corset
5
. This has aroused a 
debate concerning what were his ‘real’ sexual inclinations. 
6. Anti-cult: as we shall see in the next section, there were and still are 
people in Finland, on the political left in particular, who do not like, 
even detest Mannerheim, his memory and his cult. They slander his 
popular, right-wing ‘beautified’ image and admire Lenin instead.
6
 
This leaves the historian a difficult task: he should work as a myth-buster, not 
only excavating the layers of cult in order to find or preserve the ‘real’ 
Mannerheim but he also should be able to expose the intentions, motives and 
goals why fantasies and dubious representations are being manufactured. 
Certainly, they are not always very serious but rather innocent, like in the 
cartoon showing Mannerheim jealous of Hitler during his 75
th
 birthday party in 
1942 in which the captures read: Mannerheim asks “Wasn’t it my birthday 
party?” and President R. Ryti dragging Hitler away to his quarters answers: “Am 
I not the President of Finland?” (PICTURE 2). This, more, so to say, human side 
of Mannerheim seems to be appearing also in recent historical reappraisals 
which depict him as an obstinate and irritable commander for his Generals.
7
 
A brief history of the Mannerheim cult 
The juxtaposition of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Mannerheim can be dated back to 
the aftermath of the Finnish Civil War in 1918. As a commander of the 
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victorious White army, he machinated the White terror, summary executions of 
Red prisoners and prison camps where hunger and disease killed thousands. For 
this he earned the nickname ‘slaughterer’ by the surviving Reds (workers, 
crofters) and their children whereas the winning side (landowners, bourgeoisie, 
church) idolized him as the Savior of Finland from communism. As the 
Ostrobothnian – the base from where Mannerheim recruited his White soldiers – 
folklore had it: “Here nobody can slander God, Mannerheim or me!”.
8
 This 
cleavage has remained ever since in the Finnish political culture, and the schism 
has flared up every now and then. Although Mannerheim fell out of favour in the 
radically leftist, ‘progressive’ 1960s and 1970s
9
, the highly positive image of 
him among the Conservative, political right never truly eroded. It was a shock to 
them in 1962 when the modernist writer, Paavo Rintala in his Mummoni ja 
Mannerheim (My Grandmother and Mannerheim) showed Mannerheim as an 
anti-hero, drinking straight from the bottle, swearing and kicking his male 
servant when drunk. The Conservatives had their turn in 1967, on the 100
th
 
birthday anniversary of Mannerheim, when his Savior-role in Finnish history, in 
the midst of the so called ‘People’s Front’-type political culture, rehabilitated. It 
was found that he was for the Finns, who, we were told, usually had no 
inclination to “personality cult” (henkilöpalvonta), a truly exceptional figure, the 
only one whom they would idolize.
10
 Realizing the political value of the 
resurrected Mannerheim to the Right, the Left was infuriated and castigated this 
cult-building as “shameful political demonstrations against democracy and the 
Soviet Union”.
11
 In times of ‘finlandization’, the ‘noble’ Mannerheim might 
have insulted the Soviet leaders, who did not want to see his picture on the walls 
of residence of the President of Finland. And even after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, there seems to be no end to this erasing of Mannerheim by the 
Left. A popular leftist writer, Hannu Salama from Tampere, the hotbed of 
Finnish ‘Reddism’, reminded Finns in a TV interview that they should 
remember him as a murderer of 10.000 Reds prisoners in 1918. This was a direct 
onslaught to the poll by which Mannerheim was voted in 2005 to be the “Grea-
test Finn ever”. To aggravate the issue, one historian found out that in 1918, 
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Mannerheim enrolled in commando forces, young boys who were devoid of 
sympathy and could not foresee the consequences of their deeds, to cleanse 
Finland from the remaining Reds.
12
 Without further probing these diverse and 
contradictory elements of the Mannerheim-cult, one can say that it has worked 
with such repetitions and counterpoints (anti-cult) that make it an omnipresent, 
socially and politically dividing feature in Finnish political culture. 
The Mannerheimiana 
As an example of the recent revival of practices of Mannerheim-cult, I have 
chosen a text that nicely represents the rhetoric of the nationalist, neo-
conservative side of the Finnish political culture. It is the first volume of the 
series celebrating Mannerheim’s memory entitled Mannerheimiana (2004). 
Although its readership has not been wide as its edition is limited and it is 
distributed only by the Mannerheim Museum, it is advertised by its editors to be 
a harbinger of texts that “provide background material and historical depth to 
security political discussion” which has great significance for all Finns. 
Consequently, the personality of Mannerheim is entangled with up-to-date 
defense-political debates, and lifted in a problematic way onto a high platform 
from where it can teach useful lessons in solving post-Cold War problems – e.g. 
whether Finland should join the NATO or not – as well as be a model for 
national leadership in critical times (cf. the Winter War). Thus, Mannerheim is 
again made incarnate such indispensable moral qualities that could “heal the soul 
of the sick nation” and give its youth an anchor of moral stamina resembling that 
of the Cadet Corps.
13
 
One should notice that the organizations behind the Mannerheimiana -
venture are not directly party-political but present themselves as ‘expert’, 
rearguard influence on wider national issues. The publisher, Champion of 
Liberty Association, was established in 2000 to cultivate Mannerheim’s memory 
and to promote the knowledge of his career “in gaining freedom to Finland 
[1918] and in preserving a democratic social order in the country”.
14
 In this 
sense, it is deeply conservative, if not die-hard, working closely with kindred-
minded institutions devoted to Mannerheim’s heritage, namely Mannerheim 
Museum (est. 1951), Mannerheim Foundation, Mannerheim’s Heritage 
Foundation (est. 1973) and Marshal Mannerheim’s Hunting Cabin Society (est. 
1958). Retired, highly-ranking officers of the Finnish army feature prominently 
in the leadership of the Champion of Liberty Association, foremost of them be-
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ing Lieutenant-General Ermei Kanninen, the former Chief-of-Staff. Fittingly, in 
some of the articles of the Mannerheimiana a self-assured but at times naively 
and unconditionally ‘truth-telling’, patriotic and paternalist tone can be heard. It 
gives the book its peculiar flavor of unchallengeable authority of noble public 
moralism. The authors naturally presuppose that the political system of Finland 
– the term ‘democracy’ is mentioned only once – cannot survive without great 
leaders like Mannerheim was. It sounds as if the military contributors, many of 
whom have experienced both the Winter and Continuation War, were as right as 
Mannerheim himself had been in his distanced aristocratic attitude and 
successful military strategy. It is these contributions from high moral ground that 
create a new, magnified Mannerheim, not the ones in the first half of the book 
written by professional historians or other scholars who were not intent on 
pursuing any cult-making but deal with some forgotten or less well-known 




One basic assumption behind the arguments of the cult-making articles in the 
Mannerheimiana is that there exists an unbroken bond between the nation and 
its great leaders through historical time (cf. Thomas Carlyle’s classic hero-
worship). It is regarded as corroborated by accumulated national-historical 
experience that nations cannot survive without great men’s exceptional 
“competence” and that the education of such persons is of paramount importance 
to any country. In times of war it is the military heroes who strengthen the 
“national spirit of defense” but they are also needed in peacetime since the 
memory of  their deeds and military virtues invigorate the morale of a nation, 
somewhat slackened without warfare and military exercise. The mega-subject, 
‘nation’, is in need of great brains in modern democracies like the body politic 
needed a king to head the state in the era of Absolutism. Furthermore, in times of 
crisis the leadership and power are usually concentrated in the hands of a single 
person, the great leader. Accordingly, we are being told, Mannerheim stands in 
line with Churchill and Roosevelt – Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini are, as “Great 
but bad leaders”, denied the access to the pantheon-gallery.
16
  
But which dispositions and propensities make Mannerheim the greatest Finn 
of international stature to the propagandists of the Mannerheimiana? It is 
biology, more precisely Mannerheim’s “blood heritage” but selectively at that. 
One author, Colonel Lappalainen, tells of Mannerheim’s Finnish, peasants 
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origins in his mother’s family line but forgets to mention that his father was 
Swedish-Finnish aristocrat. Referring to an obscure ‘natural law’ that “every 
person has his/her own dose of strength of soul in his/her blood”, Lappalainen 
lays it down that Mannerheim had inherited the most of it.
17
 This natural 
superiority is complemented by Mannerheim’s own preparation and self-
development which manifest the ;latent qualities and talent of a leader in him. 
Relying on the derelict language of national typology and character, Lappalainen 
accumulates the national use-value for Mannerheim-cult: in his fiction 
Mannerheim is predestined to embody such traits as “strength of will, strength of 
soul, courage, Finnish perseverance (in Finnish: sisu), self-confidence, 
determination, sense of responsibility, mental flexibility, ability of adapt, 
nervous power and reasonable ambition”, all that made him a Lieutenant-
General already in the Russian cavalry in the Great War. To crown it, 
Mannerheim is made by Lappalainen the wisest statesman in Finland before the 
Winter War because he – without being a politician –  was the person who 
advocated Nordic co-operation, a policy by which the Winter War could 
“evidently have been avoided”.
18
 In the end, Mannerheim is made to carry the 
potential of nothing less than a seer and a prophet, usually found only in 
superhuman beings, and so much so that when out of favour he knew his 
services would be needed in the future. Needless to add, no one other than 
Mannerheim could have helped Finland in hard times: he was the indispensable 
as Finland would have been conquered in 1939–1945. Without any reservations 
he is elevated to the same level of military and state leaders as St. Stephen of 
Hungary, Gustavus II Adolf of Sweden, Peter the Great and Napoleon.
19
 
The lesson the Finns should take to heart is: the use of “potential of survival” 
– yet another gift of nature – was totally dependent on the capability of leaders 
of Mannerheim’s caliber. The predicament, however, was that in present day 
Finland there were no such persons available. Military statistics told their 
gloomy message: Finnish youth was physically and mentally weakly and even 
“degenerate”. When realizing this fatality, the Finns should remember the basic 
“truth” that “unfit”, small nations may die out or be run over by the powerful, 
big ones. With this imperative, sounding very similar to the Social-Darwinist 
jargon of the late 19
th
 century, future generations were subjected to the duty to 
cultivate the physical and mental heritage of the super-Mannerheim so that the 
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Finns would survive forthcoming crises in the same way as they survived the 
wars. This was made all the more urgent as the number of war veterans, those 
who largely carried the heritage forward, was decreasing fast.
20
 Notwithstanding, 
in view of popularity of military and paramilitary organizations in Finland, it 
seems that the Champion of Liberty Association does not have as much to worry 
about as their alarmist message implies.  
In a nutshell, for military authors of the Mannerheimiana Mannerheim was 
primus inter pares among the Finnish great men because he simply was 
“incomparable” (in Finnish: ylivertainen).
21
 In view of this, it was a great pity 
that school and university curricula did not teach any “Mannerheim-doctrine”. In 
future crises new Mannerheims were desperately needed, and in the meanwhile, 
Finland could prosper only if the principles of Mannerheim-morality were 
applied in all sectors of life. The so called “Mannerheim-knowledge” – buried in 
his Memoirs
22
 – as the treasure of exemplary career-history should have been 
made compulsory reading for every young male Finn who wanted to succeed in 
life. It remains ambiguous what the authors meant by telling the reader that by 
time “Mannerheim’s importance was further clarified and emphasized” but the 
prediction appears to indicate that it may be easier for future generations to 
realize how far-sighted and statesmanlike Mannerheim actually was, for 
example, in his “attempts at healing the wounds of 1918” and at quelling the 
language strife between the Finnish- and Swedish-speakers in Finland.
23
 He is 
made a tool the politics of national reconciliation and social harmony, of the 
politics of memory that aims at making people forget past conflicts dividing the 
nation and at rallying them behind the goal of ‘survival’. A utopian Finland is 
envisaged where there is no class hatred nor minority disputes. Politics of this 
kind is typical of the neo-conservative public moralism purported to revive some 
supposedly lost virtues in the nation so brilliantly evinced by the personality of 
Mannerheim. It is hoped that in times of materialism and secularization, 
Mannerheim can serve as a surrogate-Saviour whose sacredness should not be 
doubted. The sacredness – the core of the cult – is highlighted by gestures 
towards his philanthropic nature: we are told that during the Winter War 
Mannerheim treated his soldiers gently, as his ‘children’, when comforting the 
wounded during visits to military hospitals, in particular. Then he was also the 
Chairman of the Finnish Red Cross, the founder of the Mannerheim’s League for 
Children’s Protection and a vehement supporter of veteran organizations and the 
Finnish scout movement. All in all, Mannerheim’s appearance in Finnish history 
                                                     
 
20
 Ibid., 61.,76. 
21
 Ibidem.  
22
 E.g. C.G. Mannerheim: Erinnerungen. Atlantis Verlag, Zürich, 1952. 
23
 Lappalainen: Mannerheim kansansa johtajana. 63–64. 
49 
as the greatest leader ever is seen as the “miracle” which saved Finland from 
destruction many times.
24
 Actually he is displayed so great that a normal person 
could only humbly try to imitate him but never reach the same dignity and 
valour. And it is only natural that by regarding themselves as virtuous and hard-
working pupils of the Mannerheim doctrine, the military writers of  the 
Mannerheimiana created a Mannerheim also in their own image reflected in the 
mirror of Mannerheim’s heroic life. They are the priestly guardians of his cult.   
Mannerheim rides on 
It is redundant to enumerate all the great attributes dedicated to Mannerheim 
by the military writers of Mannerheimiana and other cult-mongers. More to the 
point would be to narrate of one fairly recent Mannerheim dispute as it reveals 
the vigorousness and deep-rootedness of the cult itself. It also shows how 
sensitive the Mannerheim-issue still is in Finland as it touches the raw nerve of 
aesthetic sense of the some artistic Finns. 
All of us who have visited Helsinki could not but look at the statue of riding 
Mannerheim in front of the museum of modern art, Kiasma (see PICTURE 3). 
For many a Finn this statue is one of the best symbols of the nation and nothing 
should tarnish it. But alas, Kiasma produced an art exhibition in summer 2006 
called Ars in which artists were commissioned to paint the walls of the museum 
in five colours, leaving the riding Mannerheim in front of “black contraption of 
barbed wire, a pistol with bullets and gallons of gasoline”. According to the 
dumbfounded critic, this could not but arouse “negative impressions” in the 
minds of beholders and really was a blasphemy to Mannerheim’s glorious 
memory. More seriously, the silhouette of Mannerheim seen against this terrible 
background could be politically harmful: a foreigner would realize that Finland, 
hosting the summits of the European Union (2006), “yarned for a revolution and 
idolized terrorism”, politics diametrically opposite to consensual democratic 
practice. In the crooked imagination of the critics, the Ars was a national shame, 
and they exhorted the beholders turn away from it and try to remember what the 
‘real’ Mannerheim looked like.
25
 The same angry attitude is recommended 
against the expressions of artistic symbolism which depict Mannerheim as a 
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homosexual or otherwise deviant man.
26
 The image of him should serve as a 
symbol of purity for all Finns as well as ‘a clean show-case’ for the foreigners to 
look at them, and no satire should slander it.  
The question arises: what other functions does the Mannerheim-cult fulfill 
than being a shield against dangers of social unrest and loss of national identity, 
interpreted in a neo-traditionalist way? Does it in its elevated posture guard the 
nation against, for example, increasing economic uncertainty and the expansion 
of refusal identity among the disenchanted people? Does it really appeal to the 
sentiments of the Finnish youth today? The message of cult, not geared, for 
example, to social reform policies but aimed at reviving the feelings of national 
solidarity and cohesion, attracts the newly patriotic and largely populist right-
wing strata of the society. The Mannerheim-cult’s ancient ideological rival, the 
cult of Lenin, does no longer count as a viable alternative, irrespective of the fact 
the Lenin museum in Tampere attracts more foreign tourists than the 
Mannerheim museum. One reason why Mannerheim-cult can live on is that in 
such stable societies as Finland, history of great men lends support to 
continuities and allows room for such historical personalities on whom to anchor 
the value of national existence and essence. Occasional polarities in Finnish 
political culture perpetuate debates between icon-makers and icon-busters but it 
seems that Lenin has receded to the past and his positive memory lingers on in 
the minds of extreme Leftists (communists) but Mannerheim rides on among 
wider public. While professional historians attempt to disseminate a rather 
realistic image of him in the public
27
, in the market of visual arts and literature 
he has, become a fictional product catering to feminine and peace-making 
qualities of softness and tolerance on one hand, and to the masculine qualities 
associated with Rambo-types on the other.
28
 Obviously, the realistic, ‘dull’ 
Mannerheim does not satisfy the popular needs of people who live the world of 
ever-increasing fantasies, the latest of them being that a black man plays 
Mannerheim in a 2nd-rate romantic movie.      
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